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The Time Course of Attention
It Is Better Than We Thought
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ABSTRACT—What is the time course of attention? Research
using rapid-stimulus streams has suggested that it is rather
slow: Attention takes half a second to recover from proc-
essing one thing before it can process the next. This period
is referred to as the attentional blink, and it is thought to
reflect a fundamental bottleneck in conscious processing.
If this period does exist, such a limitation would have se-
vere consequences in real-life situations in which multiple
events may rapidly succeed each other (e.g., in traffic).
However, findings that support the attentional blink are at
odds with other findings indicating that attention is not
reduced, but enhanced, following potentially important
occurrences. The article reviews evidence that these op-
posite effects are actually closely related. The attentional
blink is a consequence of selection mechanisms that are not
severely limited, but have an adaptive function: They en-
hance perception in response to relevant information but
suppress perception in response to irrelevant information.
It means that humans are better geared for real life than
was previously thought.
KEYWORDS—attention; dynamics; time course; selection;
suppression
Imagine two relevant events happening in rapid succession. For
example, the car in front of you switches on first its brake lights
and then, a fraction of a second later, one of its turn indicators.
How long does it take to switch your attention from one event to
the other? The answer has clear implications for a world in which
people are bombarded with information in ever-increasing
quantities, at ever-increasing speeds.
To find out how long it takes to switch attention, researchers
vary the time between two relevant events (targets), and then
determine how long it takes observers to detect the second one
after seeing the first. Figure 1A illustrates such a task. A rapid
stream of characters appears at a single location, at a rate of
about 100 milliseconds per item. Most of the characters (in this
case, the letters) serve as distractors, but two of them (the digits)
are targets, and the observer is asked to report both. Important
for determining the time course of attention is the time between
the two targets, referred to as lag. Because the items are pre-
sented at a fixed rate, lag also corresponds directly to the number
of distractors between the targets.
Figure 1B shows the typical findings: Reporting of the first of the
two targets is fine, but the second target is often missed when
presented within about 500 milliseconds after the first. Analogous
to the temporal blindness experiencedduring aneyeblink, it is as if
attention itself blinks for half a second while it is busy processing
the first target. Hence the phenomenon is called the attentional
blink (Raymond, Shapiro,&Arnell, 1992).Note that the attentional
blink is not instantaneous: The second target is reported when it
immediately follows the first target. Apparently, the blink needs
about 100 milliseconds before it starts developing.
LIMITED CAPACITY
All prevalent theories stress limited cognitive resources as the
cause of the attentional blink (Shapiro, Arnell, & Raymond,
1997). It is thought that the first target occupies a fundamental
bottleneck related to the target’s consolidation into conscious-
ness. This bottleneck causes attention to be unavailable for the
second target for up to 500 milliseconds. Figure 1C illustrates
this type of account, and shows its intuitive appeal: The hy-
pothesized availability of attention corresponds directly to the
performance function in Figure 1B.
The topic of hundreds of publications in the past 15 years, the
attentional blink has become a classic phenomenon in atten-
tion research, and the limited-capacity explanation is well
established. The blink paradigm has been linked to central
psychological concepts such as perception, short-term memory,
response selection (e.g., which key needs to be pressed), arousal,
and consciousness; it has also been used to draw conclusions
about the cognitive limitations of various populations, such as
those suffering from age-related cognitive decline, depression,
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Fig. 1. A typical attentional blink task. In the task (A), participants are
asked to report the digit targets from a stream of letter distractors all pre-
sented at the same location. Typical behavioral results (B) show a marked
deficit for the second target for a period of about 500 milliseconds after the
first; according to limited-capacity theories, this deficit (the attentional blink)
is due to the temporarydrainage of attentional resources (C).But a temporary
enhancement of attention (D) suggested by a number of other tasks (e.g.,
Reeves & Sperling, 1986) may actually underlie the attentional blink,
according to the reactive suppression account (Olivers, Van der Stigchel, &
Hulleman, in press; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992).
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stroke, impulsivity, blindness, cutting of the corpus callosum
(the connection between the two brain hemispheres), dyslexia,
Parkinson’s, Alzheimer’s, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disor-
der, and schizophrenia. For example, Rokke, Arnell, Koch, and
Andrews (2002) found a deeper attentional blink in depressed
people, and concluded that depression leads to a further
reduction or slowing in the allocation of resources necessary
for consciousness. Moreover, the conclusion that attention is
so easily knocked out for half a second even in young healthy
individuals has obvious implications for real-life situations
involving the rapid succession of potentially important events,
such as driving a car (Trick, Enns, Mills, & Vavrik, 2004). For
instance, if a driver traveling at 100 km/h (approximately
60 mph) sees a hazard on the roadway ahead, half a second
means the car will travel another 14 meters (15 yards) before the
driver’s foot even starts moving toward the brake. Because of
these implications, it is of utmost importance to fully understand
the underlying causes of the attentional blink.
TEMPORARYATTENTIONAL ENHANCEMENT
Whereas the attentional blink suggests a temporary reduction
in attention following an important event, other research sug-
gests exactly the opposite, namely that performance tempo-
rarily improves after encountering relevant events (Nakayama
& Mackeben, 1989; Reeves & Sperling, 1986). For example,
Reeves and Sperling (1986) used a task similar to the attentional
blink task but with two simultaneous streams, one consisting of
letters, the other consisting of digits. The task was to monitor the
letter stream for a specific target, which then served as a signal to
switch to the digit stream and report as many digits as possible.
By assessing which digits were andwhich were not reported from
this second stream, Reeves and Sperling could determine which
items received most attention. This resulted in a performance
function quite opposite to that of the attentional blink: Proba-
bility of report first increased relatively rapidly with time, and
then decreased gradually. Figure 1D shows the shape of this
attentional enhancement function.
Outside the laboratory, such a temporary enhancement makes
sense, because it prepares the organism for action in relation to
the relevant event. It is probably best described as the little
‘‘jump’’ one experiences when, after an impatient period of an-
ticipation, the phone finally rings, or the light finally changes to
green. It is as if a brief burst of adrenaline rushes through one’s
system. In fact, this may be precisely what happens: A likely
neurophysiological correlate of the attentional enhancement is
the temporary increase in activation of the locus coeruleus, an
area of the brain stem that responds to behaviorally relevant
stimuli and is responsible for the cortical release of the
attention-enhancing neurotransmitter noradrenaline (Aston-Jones,
Rajkowski, & Cohen, 2000).
Thus, researchers are confronted with an interesting paradox:
According to one account, target detection triggers an episode
during which attentional resources are strongly reduced. Yet,
according to the other, target detection triggers an episode
duringwhich additional attentional resources are being recruited.
What’s more, these two episodes show a remarkably similar time
course. As Figure 1 shows, both reach maximum effect around
100 milliseconds after onset of their respective functions, and
both last for several hundreds of milliseconds. The similarity is
very suggestive: Are the two phenomena related? If they are, how
then do they, at the same time, result in such opposite effects?
REACTIVE SUPPRESSION
A closer comparison of Figure 1C and 1D provides some clues.
The attentional blink appears to be the vertical mirror image of
the temporary attentional enhancement, but shifted by about
100 milliseconds. We could therefore reconcile these two
opposite mechanisms, if we assume that the one acts in direct
response to the other, within about a tenth of a second. This is
what Raymond et al. (1992) originally proposed but later
abandoned. However, we believe the idea deserves revival
(Olivers, Van der Stigchel, & Hulleman, in press).
Note further from Figure 1D that when the first target triggers
the temporary enhancement, this enhancement reaches its peak
only when the target has already been replaced with a distractor.
In other words, the wrong information is being enhanced.
Because it is the duty of attention to keep irrelevant information
out of consciousness, attention can respond to this powerful
distractor signal only by strongly suppressing further input. If it
is further assumed that this suppressive response takes some
100 milliseconds to take effect, then it may actually occur too
late for the distractor itself. Instead, the immediately following
item will be suppressed the most. If this item turns out to be a
target, an attentional blink is observed.
According to this reactive suppression account, distractors,
rather than targets, cause the attentional blink. If true, then there
should be no blink as long as no distractors are encountered. This
is exactly what my colleagues and I (Olivers et al., in press) ob-
served. We asked participants to identify the targets in sequential
triplets of items, such as . . . TDT. . . and . . . TTT. . . (T denoting a
target, D denoting a distractor) embedded in a stream of dis-
tractors. Note that the final targets in these two triplets are in
exactly the same temporal position relative to the first target, and
therefore a limited-capacity account would predict an attentional
blink in both cases. Yet performance differed remarkably: There
was a clear blink for the final target in the TDT triplet, whereas
there was no blink for any of the targets in the TTT triplet (see also
Di Lollo, Kawahara, Ghorashi, & Enns, 2005).
Furthermore, if the suppression is indeed responsive to the
incoming stimuli, it should be lifted when it is no longer
required. In support of this, we (Olivers et al., in press) found that
sequences like TDTT generated suppression for the second
target (in response to the immediately preceding distractor), but
not for the third (the suppression was lifted in response to the
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preceding target). Thus, unlike the limited-capacity account,
which sees the attentional blink as a ballistic process that cannot
be stopped once induced, the reactive-suppression account
allows for relatively rapid adaptations to changing stimulation.
LESS IS MORE
A rather counterintuitive prediction is that performance should
improve when the targets are made less relevant to the observer.
This is because less relevant targets will trigger a weaker and
shorter attentional response, and thus the distractors following
the target will receive less attention. As a consequence, the
reactive suppression will also be weaker.
This prediction appears to be borne out by our data (Olivers &
Nieuwenhuis, 2005), as well as that of Arend, Johnston, and
Shapiro (2006). These studies compared performance in
standard attentional blink conditions to conditions in which
participants were slightly diverted from the central task (in order
to make it less relevant). For example, we asked participants
to actively think about their holiday plans, or to perform the
additional task of listening to a tune and detect a yell in it
(Olivers & Nieuwenhuis, 2005), whereas Arend et al. distracted
participants by presenting moving or twinkling dots in the
background. All these manipulations had the same effect: The
attentional blink was reduced. In other words, and contrary
to what would be expected on the basis of limited-capacity
accounts, taking away attentional resources from the streammay
be beneficial rather than harmful.
Also telling is a study by Nieuwenstein and Potter (2006).
They found an attentional blink when observers were asked
to identify two specific targets from a stream. Interestingly,
identification of the same targets improved considerably when
observers were asked to report the entire stream, even though
this task would presumably require more resources. Similarly,
Ferlazzo, Lucido, Di Nocera, Fagioli, and Sdoia (in press) found
a substantial attentional blink when observers were instructed
to ‘‘report the individual letters’’ embedded in a stream, but
virtually no attentional blink when observers were instructed to
‘‘report the syllable’’ made up of the very same letters in the same
temporal positions.
All these studies suggest that having to process an object (and
having the resources this requires) is not the main problem.What
is detrimental is having to select a particular object. Selection
leads to temporary enhancement, but also to the need for reactive
suppression when the wrong object turns out to be enhanced.
It deserves mentioning that these benefits from diverting at-
tention away from a specific target may well be limited to the
attentional blink task, in which targets are quickly replaced by
distractors (and thus diversion acts to take attention away from
these distractors). In real-world circumstances (e.g., driving),
relevant objects are usually not that quickly replaced, and
taking attention away from them may be harmful.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
What becomes clear is that the attentional blink may not reflect
the shortcomings of attention, but its strengths: Rather than a
fundamental bottleneck that takes a whopping 500 milliseconds
to clear, the attentional blink is a dynamic, adaptive gating sys-
tem that adequately responds to changing stimuli, and does so
fairly rapidly—within about 100 milliseconds. In the real world,
100 milliseconds is quick enough, because real-world objects
usually tend to stay around for a little longer than that. It is in
laboratory settings that allow for stimuli to change every 100
milliseconds or less that the true temporal limitations of attention
are revealed. The important point here is that these limitations
are far less dramatic than proponents of limited-capacity ac-
counts claim. This is just as well: Humans probably would not
have survived for long if our attention had been knocked out for
half a second each time we saw something relevant.
This does not make the attentional blink task useless for the
real world; it is still an important tool with which to investigate
the dynamics of attention. Knowledge of these dynamics opens
up, and puts limitations on, new ways of presenting informa-
tion—for example, adaptive, rapid, serial presentations on the
small screens of handheld devices (e.g., Oquist & Goldstein,
2003). What the present review suggests is that such presenta-
tions could easily be done at rates of up to 100 milliseconds per
item (which is faster than normal reading speed) as long as the
triggering of a strong attentional episode is prevented. In other
words, users should not be required to select any specific word,
because they will be likely to miss several other words.
Furthermore, if the attentional blink indeed reflects not the
absence of attention but its active presence, then researchers
may need to re-evaluate their conclusions about clinical popu-
lations in which the blink has been found to be deepened or
prolonged (such as in the earlier-mentioned depressed observ-
ers; Rokke et al., 2002). Rather than reflecting a further
narrowing and protracting of a cognitive bottleneck, the impair-
ments may reflect decreased flexibility on a smaller underlying
time scale, possibly leading to overzealous suppression in
response to irrelevant information. Future research will have
to focus on these underlying dynamics and especially on
the neurophysiological mechanisms responsible for them (e.g.,
Nieuwenhuis, Gilzenrat, Holmes, & Cohen, 2005). Ideally,
clinical populations could then benefit from behavioral and
psychopharmacological interventions that successfully modu-
late these small-scale dynamics.
Finally, the current research issues a general warning that we
should not take an overarching time course of a psychological
effect at face value, because the underlying microdynamics may
be quite different from (and even opposite to) what the overall
picture suggests. This is no doubt true for many areas other than
the attention field—areas such as memory, motor control, and
cognitive development. Probably one of the biggest problems in
studying the cognitive system is exactly this: It never sits still!
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